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Central to many of the most violent clashes fought on the battleground of consent are 
disagreements about the conditions under which consent is rendered ineffective. A clearer 
understanding of these conditions, of the limits to consent’s capacity to legitimise, is key 
to unravelling the foundations of liberal morality and its attendant conflicts. Such an 
understanding promises significant contributions to enduring worries about moral 
constraints on the market and about the justification of political authority. Beyond this, 
questions about the conditions under which consent is rendered ineffective are central to 
many other prominent debates. When is consent to sex effective? How must doctors go 
about obtaining the consent of their patients if they are to ensure that such consent is 
effective? Can one consent to be killed and, if so, in what circumstances? 
The literature on consent is replete with assertions about limits to consent’s 
capacity to legitimise. Such assertions, based as they are on contested intuitions, lead us 
into a maze of disagreement with no obvious way out. In order to tidy up these intuitions 
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and to navigate a course to greater clarity, we need to uncover the deeper moral principles 
on which these intuitions are based. 
 
I. WHAT CONSENT IS 
Before we launch into an investigation of the grounds of limits to consent’s capacity to 
legitimise, it may be helpful to begin with a few more general comments about the 
understanding of consent with which I shall be working. Consent is an act, an 
intentionally performed behaviour that may take the form of either an action or an 
omission.
 
Examples of consent by action include the signing of a contract and the uttering 
of the words, ‘Yes, go ahead’, in response to a doctor’s asking whether he may stick a 
needle in you. An example of consent by omission is consenting to a chairperson’s 
proposal in a meeting by not speaking up when asked by the chairperson whether there 
are any objections. The presence of consent does require, in addition to an act, that 
certain psychological conditions be fulfilled, most importantly that the consenting agent 
knows that her act will count as an act of consent. But unlike subjective views of consent, 
my view does not regard the fulfilment of psychological conditions as sufficient for 
consent without the performance of a relevant act.
1
 
Acts of consent can bring about changes. In morality, consent allows agents to 
change their rights, and the duties that correlate to them. Consent legitimises by changing 
rights: when an agent consents, she either waves her rights and grants liberties to another 
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agent, or she waives her liberties and grants rights to another agent, or she does both of 
these things.
2
 
It is worth noting that consent does not only operate in morality. We are familiar 
with consent’s role in law.3 But consent is also used in other systems of rules. For 
example, when playing the board game Monopoly, one may consent to the exchange of a 
property that one has purchased for another player’s property. Such consents do not have 
moral or legal implications. Rather, they have implications for the future course of the 
game. Nevertheless, although consent can operate in prescriptive systems other than 
morality, it is consent’s role in morality with which we shall be primarily concerned, 
since it is in the theatre of morality where liberalism’s perennial battles are fought. 
Let us now turn to the main concern of this paper: limits to consent’s capacity to 
legitimise. I will begin by setting out some of the disagreements that exist about these 
limits, in order to support the claim that we are in need of a theoretical grounding with 
which to chart a course through these troubled waters. 
 
II. SOME DISAGREEMENTS ABOUT LIMITS TO CONSENT’S CAPACITY TO 
LEGITIMISE 
Procedural Limits 
We can divide limits to consent’s capacity to legitimise into two types. The first 
type of limit is the procedural limit. Procedural limits demand that, in order successfully 
to legitimise other agents’ actions and claims, consent must be given in the absence of 
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certain background conditions. It will be useful to consider procedural limits under three 
headings. Under each of these headings, various types of deficiency, levels of deficiency, 
or deficiencies with particular geneses have been thought to render consent ineffective. 
But whilst there is agreement that at least some such deficiencies can render consent 
ineffective, there is widespread disagreement over which particular forms, levels or 
geneses of deficiency render consent ineffective. 
 
i. Alternatives 
It is often thought that an agent’s consent fails to legitimise if the agent’s 
alternative options to consenting are deficient in some specific way. The most widely 
affirmed of such claims is the claim that when an agent’s option set is manipulated by 
another’s coercive threat, such that the agent has no better alternative than to consent, 
then the coerced agent’s consent is ineffective. But even here there are disagreements. It 
is sometimes thought that the option set resulting from the coercive threat must satisfy a 
more demanding criterion than merely making consent the best option, in order for the 
coercive threat to render consent ineffective. That, for example, the threat must leave the 
agent with alternatives, all of which are considerably worse than consenting; or that the 
threat must leave the agent with a choice structure that entitles her to accede to the threat, 
in order for the agent’s consent to be rendered ineffective. Further disagreements arise 
over precisely what sort of threats can render consent ineffective. If an agent A, whose 
set of options has been appropriately constrained, consents in order to avoid B’s carrying 
out a threat to bring about an undesirable outcome, is this sufficient to render A’s consent 
ineffective? Or is A’s consent rendered ineffective by B’s threat only if B threatens to 
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bring about an undesirable outcome by acting immorally? If the latter, do any such threats 
render consent ineffective, or only threats to violate rights? Can certain types of offer 
coerce, in a manner which renders consent ineffective?
4
 
 Coercive threats (and perhaps offers) are not the only method by which an agent’s 
option set can be made deficient in a manner sometimes thought to render consent 
ineffective. It is also sometimes claimed that if an agent’s option set was significantly 
impoverished because of some earlier wrongdoing, consent is ineffective. For example, if 
I push you down a hole, it seems plausible that your subsequent consent to pay me one 
million pounds to lower down a rope by which you could climb out of the hole is 
ineffective.
5
 Hume famously complains, against Locke’s theory of tacit consent, that the 
claim that ‘a poor peasant or artisan has a free choice to leave his country when he knows 
no foreign language or manners, and lives from day to day, by the small wages which he 
acquires’ is as absurd as the claim ‘that a man, by remaining in a vessel, freely consents 
to the dominion of the master; though he was carried on board while asleep, and must 
leap into the ocean, and perish, the moment he leaves her’.6  Indeed, it is sometimes even 
claimed that prior wrongdoing is unnecessary to render consent ineffective; that when an 
agent suffers from an absence of acceptable alternatives, even when the genesis of her 
situation involves no wrongdoing on anyone’s part, her consent is rendered ineffective.7 
 
ii. Information 
In order for an agent’s act to count as consent, the agent must know both that her 
act counts as an act of consent, and to what her act counts as an act of consent (unless her 
ignorance is negligent). But beyond this, informational deficiencies of other types are 
 6 
often thought to render consent ineffective: deficiencies such as the absence of true 
information, or the presence of false beliefs, which have to do with the background 
context in which consent is given or with the likely consequences of the consent.
 
 
Among intuitions of this type, perhaps the most widely held is the intuition that 
fraudulent claims made by the recipient of an act of consent can sometimes render 
consent ineffective. (I will refer to the agent to whom consent is given as the recipient.) 
But there are still disagreements with respect to further questions. If the recipient did not 
actively lie, but simply omitted to pass on relevant information, can this suffice to render 
consent ineffective? For example, if a company selling a special strain of maize seeds to 
farmers fails to tell the farmers that, unlike normal maize seeds, their seeds will strip the 
earth of its nutrients and render the land uncultivable within five years, is the consent of 
those farmers who purchase the seeds rendered ineffective by this failure? Does it matter 
whether the recipient knew that the information he was passing on was false, and if he 
didn’t, does it matter whether he was negligent in not knowing that the information was 
false? Can false information from sources other than the recipient render consent 
ineffective? 
 
iii. Competence 
Under the heading of competence, it is widely thought that conditions which 
compromise an agent’s ability to make rational decisions, conditions such as youth, 
mental incapacitation, psychosis and intoxication, can render consent ineffective. Once 
again, however, disagreement is never far away. One group of disagreements concern the 
questions, what degrees of youth, incapacitation, psychosis, intoxication and so on are 
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required to render consent ineffective? Another group of disagreements are concerned 
with responsibility. It is widely agreed that consent is ineffective if the recipient of the 
consent maliciously caused the incompetence – if, for example, he forcibly injected the 
consenting agent with some intoxicating drug immediately prior to her consent. But what 
if the consenting agent was fully aware and responsible for her own intoxication, or other 
form of incompetence? Should her consent be taken as effective? Voluntary intoxication 
does not generally serve to release those who commit crimes from taking responsibility 
for their crimes, so should it similarly fail to free those who consent from taking 
responsibility for the consequences of their consent?  
Even if one thinks that in cases such as voluntary intoxication by recreational 
alcohol consumption, voluntarily induced incompetence sometimes does not render 
consent ineffective, there are nevertheless other cases of voluntarily induced 
incompetence which certainly do seem to render consent ineffective. For example, 
suppose that an agent is taking consciousness-impairing drugs necessary to suppress 
some serious illness, or that she is regaining consciousness after an operation under 
general anaesthetic. In such cases, her consent (to all but the most urgent or frivolous of 
matters) would seem to be ineffective, despite the fact that she voluntarily rendered 
herself incompetent, or voluntarily allowed herself to be rendered incompetent. One 
might object that her impaired consciousness was rendered involuntary by the fact that 
she needed to have her consciousness impaired in order to escape the consequences of her 
illness or to undergo the operation. But it seems plausible to assert that her consent would 
be equally ineffective if the operation for which she had been anaesthetised was beauty-
enhancing plastic surgery. 
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Substantive Limits 
The second type of limit to consent’s capacity to legitimise is the substantive 
limit. Whereas procedural limits are concerned with the background conditions under 
which consent is given, substantive limits are concerned with what the consenting agent 
is seeking to legitimise. 
Disagreement about substantive limits is every bit as deep seated as disagreement 
about procedural limits, if not more so. Can one effectively consent to be killed? If yes, 
can one always effectively consent to be killed, or only in certain special circumstances? 
Can one effectively consent to be tortured? Can one, to bring into focus the difficult 
question faced by the court in the 2003-4 headline trial of the German cannibal, Armin 
Meiwes, whose victim was willingly eaten, effectively consent to be eaten?
8
 There is also 
disagreement about the extent and details of the interaction between procedural and 
substantive limits. Certain procedural limits only seem to ‘kick in’ when the stakes are 
sufficiently high. For example, if a little girl consents to purchase a small chocolate 
mouse for an appropriate price, we would treat her consent as effective. But if she 
consents to surgery, we might consider her consent ineffective without the further 
consent of her parents. And if she consents to sex, we might consider her consent 
ineffective even with the further consent of her parents. But there will be widespread 
disagreement about the age at which the girl becomes competent enough to decide to 
consent on these various matters, reflecting disagreement not only about how competent 
the girl is at various ages, but also about the level of competence required for consent to 
legitimise different things.
9
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III. THE INSUFFICIENCY OF PATERNALIST EXPLANATIONS 
As the preceding comments suggest, intuition provides inadequate guidance in discerning 
limits to consent’s capacity to legitimise. Whilst there are a handful of widely agreed-
upon limits, there are many more disputed limits of varying scope. In order to reach 
firmer conclusions about limits to consent’s capacity to legitimise, we need to identify the 
deeper sources of disagreement by considering why there should be any limits placed on 
consent’s capacity to legitimise at all. That is, we need to explain the existence of the 
intuitions discussed above by showing how they manifest deeper moral principles. 
Where existing discussions of limits to consent’s capacity to legitimise do go 
beyond mere assertion, they tend to argue that limits to consent’s capacity to legitimise 
exist in order to benefit agents by preventing agents from making ill-considered decisions 
to consent when it will likely harm them to do so. Such explanations are paternalist in 
nature: they suggest that morality incorporates these limits in order to protect us from 
ourselves. Paternalist explanations implicitly appeal to a deeper moral principle, 
according to which prescriptions that appropriately benefit agents should be included in 
morality, or at least in a relevant subset of morality. (Which is not to say that any 
explanation that appeals to such a principle is paternalist: paternalism requires, 
additionally, that the explanation claims that a moral prescription benefits agents by 
overruling their own decisions, for their own sakes). 
Paternalist explanations of this nature are, of course, somewhat controversial. The 
controversy surrounding paternalist explanations of limits to consent’s capacity to 
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legitimise arises both out of disagreements about the legitimacy of the deeper principle, 
and out of disagreements about how likely agents are to make poor decisions for 
themselves. Among those who accept some version of the deeper principle, those who 
think that agents are quite likely to make poor decisions for themselves will favour a 
wider set of paternalist limits, whereas those who think that agents rarely make poor 
decisions to consent will favour a more restricted set of paternalist limits. Precisely 
because of these controversies, a paternalist explanation seems well equipped to explain 
several of the disagreements about intuitive limits to consent’s capacity to legitimise. The 
disagreements at the intuitive level arise from disagreements about quite how extensive a 
set of paternalist limits are necessary to protect agents against themselves, and whether 
agents should be protected against themselves at all. 
But a paternalist explanation of limits to consent’s capacity to legitimise is 
insufficient, on its own, to explain all our intuitions about limits to consent’s capacity to 
legitimise. I will argue that although paternalism provides a helpful explanation of some 
of our intuitions about limits to consent’s capacity to legitimise, we need to find a 
different explanation for other of our intuitions about the limits. For when we consider 
what types of limit can be explained by paternalist reasoning, we find that paternalist 
reasoning is well placed to explain certain types of limit, but not others. On the one hand, 
paternalist reasoning seems well placed to explain substantive limits and procedural 
limits associated with incompetence. But on the other hand, paternalist reasoning seems 
poorly equipped to explain limits associated with the availability of alternative options 
and information. Let us look at these successes and failures in turn. 
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First, paternalist reasoning is well suited to the explanation of several intuitions 
about substantive limits to consent’s capacity to legitimise, like the putative limit 
preventing agents from consenting to be tortured. Such intuitive limits can be explained 
by paternalist considerations as preventing agents from consenting to things which are 
never, or extremely rarely, beneficial for them. Procedural limits associated with 
incompetence can also be explained by paternalist considerations as protecting agents 
who, because of their incompetence, are likely to make poor decisions to consent. 
Furthermore, paternalist reasoning lends itself to an explanation of the intuition that the 
level of competence demanded in order for an agent’s consent to be effective varies 
depending on what is at stake.  
On the other hand, a paternalist explanation struggles to explain those procedural 
limits associated with lack of choice and with lack of information.
10
 In the case of lack of 
choice, an agent is no more likely to make a poor decision to consent when he lacks a 
good option set than when he doesn’t. An agent with a restricted option set might not 
relish the prospect of consenting, but if he still judges the option of consenting to be his 
best option then the mere fact that his choice is restricted is not a reason to impugn his 
judgement. In the case of lack of information, one might make a paternalist case for 
treating consent as ineffective when it is given without sufficient information or with 
mistaken beliefs in general. The paternalist grounds for such a limit would be that 
consent based on insufficient information or mistaken beliefs is more likely to be a poor 
decision than a decision based on more complete information and true beliefs. But we do 
not in fact tend to treat consent given in the absence of full information as ineffective in 
general. Rather, our intuitions on this matter are sensitive to the source of the 
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informational deficiencies. In particular, we tend to think that consent is rendered 
ineffective when information is deliberately withheld, or false information deliberately 
supplied, but not when the informational deficiencies are the consenting agent’s own 
fault. And it is hard to see how a paternalist approach could explain these intuitions, since 
the source of false or incomplete information has little bearing on the likelihood that an 
agent will make a poor decision to consent in the light of it. 
Most problematically, paternalist considerations seem unable to explain why, 
according to some of our strongest intuitions about procedural limits to consent’s 
capacity to legitimise, an important factor in determining whether consent is rendered 
ineffective often seems to be whether or not the consenting agent’s rights have been 
violated or threatened with violation. Several of the most strongly held intuitions about 
procedural limits to consent’s capacity to legitimise discussed above suggest that rights-
violations, or threatened rights-violations, often serve to render consent ineffective. 
Indeed, this intuition is shared even by libertarians, who rank transactions vitiated by 
rights violations alongside theft, as a method of transfer that fails to preserve just 
entitlements. If we can explain this intuition then we will have justified a central part of 
the libertarian theory of justice. 
It would appear, then, that although paternalist considerations can explain some of 
our intuitions about limits to consent’s capacity to legitimise, they cannot explain all of 
them. In order to explain those of our intuitions about procedural limits that suggest that 
violations or threatened violations of rights can render consent ineffective, I will argue in 
the following sections that we must appeal to principles of corrective justice concerning 
the legitimacy of gains and losses brought about by violations and threatened violations 
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of rights. The background of corrective justice is central to understanding the logic of 
rights, which in turn is necessary for an adequate understanding of consent. As I noted 
above, consent’s role in morality is to change rights. We can therefore only understand 
how consent works if we do so alongside the logic of rights and its associated norms, 
including those of corrective justice. Note, however, that the appeal to corrective justice 
is not intended to replace the paternalist explanation, which I argued does succeed in 
explaining some of our intuitions about limits to consent’s capacity to legitimise. Rather, 
the appeal is intended to supplement the paternalist explanation, in order to account for 
those our own intuitions about procedural limits to consent’s capacity to legitimise 
which, as noted, a paternalist approach is unable satisfactorily to explain. 
In the following section, I will state and defend the principles of corrective justice 
that I will ultimately use to explain limits to consent’s capacity to legitimise. 
 
IV. THE NO-GAIN AND NO-LOSS PRINCIPLES 
Rights place restrictions on what agents may and may not do to each other and each 
other’s property. But what if, despite the existence of rights, agents do in fact treat each 
other, or each other’s property, in ways that are prohibited by their rights? When an agent 
A violates the rights of another agent B, A might gain as a result of the violation and B 
might suffer losses.
 
These consequences of rights-violations, even when unintended or 
accidental, are illegitimate. As such, we seek to nullify the consequences by demanding 
compensation from the perpetrator to the victim and by demanding rectification of any 
property gained as a result of the violation. Similarly, when an agent extracts some gain 
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from another agent by threatening to violate the other’s rights, we also demand 
compensation and rectification. According to the annulment conception of corrective 
justice, norms of compensation and rectification are expressions of the following two 
principles: 
The no-gain principle: The perpetrator of a rights-violation or threatened 
rights-violation should not gain as a result of his violation or threatened 
violation of another’s rights. 
The no-loss principle: The victim of a rights-violation or threatened rights-
violation should not suffer losses as a result of the violation or threatened 
violation of his rights. 
What counts as a gain or a loss in the above two principles? There are various types of 
gain or loss about which we might ultimately be concerned. Gains and losses of property, 
of welfare, of opportunities for welfare, of freedom. The gains and losses about which 
one will ultimately be concerned will depend on what one thinks is the purpose of rights 
– what precisely it is that rights exist to protect or promote. But we need not choose 
between these ultimate concerns in order to pursue the argument here. The main 
argument of this paper, which claims that the no-gain and no-loss principles can explain 
limits to consent’s capacity to legitimise, will require us to accept that gains and losses of 
rights and liberties (as opposed to violations of rights) are themselves gains and losses of 
a type relevant to the no-gain and no-loss principles. Whatever our ultimate concerns, it is 
clear that this must be so. For if rights and liberties are not themselves either intrinsically 
valuable moral assets, or instrumentally valuable moral assets (because they protect 
 15 
welfare, opportunities, freedom, or so on), then we should have no reason to be 
concerned about their violation, and to seek corrective justice. If we care about violations 
of rights – which we do – then we must also care about gains and losses of rights and 
liberties, for the same ultimate reasons in both cases.
11
 
Note that the gains and losses are to be measured relative to what would have 
obtained had the violation or threat not occurred, not relative to what obtained 
immediately prior to the violation or threat. This is why, for example, intuition suggests 
that the victim of a violent assault can claim compensation not only for the pain that the 
assault inflicted on him, but also for the lost earnings which he would have earned had he 
not been prevented from going to work because of his injuries. 
Before we continue with the main thread of the argument, we first need to defend 
the no-gain and no-loss principles against an important objection. On the strength of the 
objection, Jules Coleman, who once defended the annulment conception of corrective 
justice, now rejects the annulment conception in favour of an alternative view.
12
 The 
objection is this. Building on criticisms put to the annulment conception by Raz, Weinrib 
and Perry, Coleman argues that the annulment conception cannot account for the special 
relationship that exists between the perpetrator and the victim of a particular crime. The 
no-gain and no-loss principles do not require that the victim of a crime receive 
compensation from the perpetrator of that very same crime. The principles would, for 
example, be satisfied by a system in which perpetrators paid into a common pool from 
which victims received compensation. Yet intuitive norms of compensation do require 
that a victim be compensated by the perpetrator of the very same crime that harmed her, 
not by perpetrators of other crimes. Hence, the argument claims, a perpetrator’s duty to 
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repair wrongful losses inflicted on his victim do not arise from the fact that the losses are 
the result of a wrongdoing, as the annulment conception claims. 
In the face of the special relationship between perpetrator and victim, Weinrib has 
argued for what Coleman calls a ‘relational conception’ of corrective justice, according to 
which corrective justice imposes on a perpetrator a duty to repair his wrong.
13
 Coleman 
himself has adopted a variation on this, which he calls the ‘mixed conception’. According 
to the mixed conception, a perpetrator has a duty to repair wrongful losses inflicted on his 
victim, the duty being grounded in the fact that the losses are the injurer’s responsibility, 
the result of his agency. The conception is ‘mixed’ in that it combines the relational view 
that the duty to repair is grounded in the responsibility of the perpetrator rather than the 
wrongfulness of the losses, with the annulment view that it is the wrongful losses that are 
to be repaired rather than the wrong itself. 
We need not reach a view about the truth or falsehood of the relational 
conception, the mixed conception, or any other similar view. The main argument of this 
paper does not depend on these views being false. What it does depend on, however, is 
the no-gain and no-loss principles being true. The assumption underlying Coleman’s 
rejection of the no-gain and no-loss principles is that either the annulment conception 
must be true, or an alternative view such as the relational or mixed conception must be 
true. But this assumption is mistaken. We can consistently endorse both the no-gain and 
no-loss principles, and something akin to the relational or mixed conception. Indeed, not 
only can we endorse both positions, we should endorse both positions. For as much as we 
need something like the relational or mixed conception to explain the special relationship 
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between perpetrator and victim, so too do we need the no-gain and no-loss principles to 
explain our intuitions about the following additional cases. 
The first problem concerns our intuitions about what should happen when a 
perpetrator is unable to compensate his victim for her losses. In at least some such 
circumstances, intuition suggests that the victim still deserves compensation for her 
losses, perhaps from the public purse. Those injured by suicide bombers, for example, 
seem to deserve some form of compensation for their injuries, even though their assailant 
is no longer able to pay (and, let us suppose, has left no estate from which payment can 
be made). This intuition can easily be explained by the no-loss principle. But the 
relational conception and the mixed conception cannot easily explain this intuition, 
because they provide no grounds for treating agents other than the perpetrator as under 
duties to compensate the victim, even when the perpetrator cannot pay. 
The second reason not to abandon the no-gain and no-loss principles in the face of 
the special relationship between perpetrator and victim, is that we need the no-gain 
principle to explain why the perpetrator of a rights-violation ought to forgo even certain 
gains that do not correspond to his victim’s wrongful losses. For example, suppose that a 
thief steals a fishing boat which has been lying idle in a harbour for several months. The 
thief takes the boat out to sea and catches many fish in it. The thief ought to return the 
boat to its owner and, if necessary, provide compensation to the owner for any losses 
incurred (for example, because the boat has been damaged). But in addition to this, the 
thief ought not to be allowed to keep the fish caught with the stolen vessel. This gain, 
which the thief is required to forfeit, is neither a part of the wrong itself nor corresponds 
to any wrongful loss on the part of the boat owner: the boat would otherwise have been 
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lying idle in the harbour. As such, neither the relational conception nor the mixed 
conception can explain why the thief should give up the fish. The no-gain principle, on 
the other hand, provides an immediate explanation of why he should do so. 
 The foregoing considerations suggest that the no-gain and no-loss principles 
should not be abandoned in the face of the special relationship between perpetrator and 
victim. Rather, they should be supplemented by additional principles. These additional 
principles might be those endorsed by the relational or mixed conceptions, or something 
similar to them. But if we treat these additional principles as alternatives to the no-gain 
and no-loss principles rather than as supplementary to them, then we are unable, I have 
argued, to explain the following two intuitions. First, the intuition that the victim of a 
rights-violation can sometimes be owed compensation by agents other than the 
perpetrator of the violation. Second, the intuition that the perpetrator of a rights-violation 
ought sometimes to have his gains nullified, even when such nullification is not required 
to compensate his victim for her losses. In the face of arguments about the special 
relationship between perpetrator and victim, we should indeed conclude that the no-gain 
and no-loss principles alone do not suffice to provide a complete explanation of all 
aspects of compensation and rectification. But I have argued that there are good reasons 
to think that the no-gain and no-loss principles must provide an important part of such an 
explanation, and that we should not abandon them for an alternative view altogether. 
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V. ARE THE NO-GAIN AND NO-LOSS PRINCIPLES GROUNDED IN BENEFIT? 
We will shortly come to the main argument of the paper, in which we will see how the 
no-gain and no-loss principles can explain limits to consent’s capacity to legitimise. But 
before we do so, I wish briefly to look at what might ground the no-gain and no-loss 
principles themselves, in order better to understand the relationship of the no-gain/no-loss 
explanation of limits to consent’s capacity to legitimise to the paternalist explanation 
examined above. We saw that paternalist explanations for limits to consent’s capacity to 
legitimise, which I argued do successfully explain some intuitive limits, rely on a deeper 
moral principle, according to which prescriptions that benefit agents in an appropriate 
manner should be included in morality, or at least in a relevant subset of morality. The 
question I presently wish to ask is, should we conclude that the no-gain and no-loss 
principles are also ultimately grounded in benefit-based considerations, so that the two 
explanations are in fact both different facets of the same ultimate benefit-based 
explanation of all limits to consent’s capacity to legitimise? 
In order to argue that the no-gain and no-loss principles exist in order to benefit 
agents, one would first need to show that they do benefit agents. So do the no-gain and 
no-loss principles benefit agents? Certainly, inclusion of the no-gain principle in morality 
benefits agents, since, provided that it is enforced, the no-gain principle removes an 
incentive for committing or threatening violations. If a would-be violator or coercer 
knows that society will, in accordance with the no-gain principle, seek to nullify any 
gains which he acquires as a result of his performing or threatening a violation, then he is 
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much less likely to perform or threaten a violation than he would otherwise be. In other 
words, enforcement of the no-gain principle serves as a deterrent to would-be violators 
and coercers. 
 Does inclusion of the no-loss principle in morality also benefit agents? Inclusion 
of the no-loss principle in morality, even when it is enforced, is likely to have a much 
smaller deterrent effect on would-be violators and coercers than the no-gain principle. 
This is because, in the case of the no-gain principle, would-be violators and coercers who 
are motivated by a desire for personal gain are likely to perform or threaten violations, 
such as a theft, that bring about gains to themselves which can be entirely nullified (for 
example, by returning stolen items to their owner). But in the case of the no-loss 
principle, the sorts of losses brought about by violations or threats likely to be performed 
by would-be violators and coercers motivated by a desire to cause suffering to another 
agent, often cannot be so easily nullified. Such violations or threats are likely to result in 
physical harm that, even with the provision of monetary compensation, cannot be made 
to vanish in a way that denies the perpetrator the satisfaction of having caused the harm 
to his victim. Hence enforcement of the no-loss principle is unlikely to remove the 
incentive of a would-be violator or coercer whose motivation for violating or threatening 
to violate rights is to harm his would-be victim. More plausibly, one might argue that the 
no-loss principle benefits agents for the same reason that possession of rights benefits 
agents. Whatever it is that one thinks that rights exist to protect or promote – welfare, 
opportunities for welfare, freedom, etc. – one can plausibly argue that such benefits are 
protected and promoted not only by rights, but also by the assurance of compensation 
when rights are violated. 
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 So there is reason to think that the no-gain and no-loss principles might 
themselves be grounded in the benefit-based justificatory principle that underlies 
paternalist limits to consent’s capacity to legitimise. But if these reasons fail to convince, 
if one thinks that the no-gain and no-loss principles are grounded in some alternative 
deeper principle, or if they are themselves fundamental principles of justice which cannot 
be explained by reference to further principles, then this conclusion does not threaten the 
arguments that follow. For even if the no-gain and no-loss principles are not grounded in 
the benefit-based justificatory principle that underlies paternalist justifications for limits 
to consent’s capacity to legitimise, this need not prevent us from seeking to explain some 
limits to consent’s capacity to legitimise in terms of the no-gain and no-loss principles. 
There is no reason why different justificatory principles should not ground different sets 
of limits to consent’s capacity to legitimise.14 
 Let us now turn, then, to the main argument of this paper, in which I will 
demonstrate how the no-gain and no-loss principles can explain and tidy up central 
intuitions about limits to consent’s capacity to legitimise. 
 
VI. THE MAIN ARGUMENT: CONSENT, GAINS AND LOSSES 
How can the no-gain and no-loss principles justify limits to consent’s capacity to 
legitimise? We have seen that when an outcome is brought about by a violation or 
threatened violation of rights, the no-gain and no-loss principles require that any gains 
and losses accruing to the perpetrator and victim respectively be nullified. When the 
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outcome brought about by a violation or threatened violation is consent – let us call such 
consent, vitiated consent – we must therefore nullify any gains and losses resulting from 
the consent. So what are the gains and losses that result from consent? They are, of 
course, the gains and losses of rights and liberties associated with the act of consent. 
In order to avoid confusion, it is important that we distinguish clearly between the 
two different roles played by rights in the argument. First, rights play a role in the genesis 
of vitiated consent: vitiated consent is consent brought about by a violation or threatened 
violation of rights. Second, rights play a role as the object of consent: effective consent 
changes agents’ rights. The argument is that when consent is vitiated by a violation or 
threatened violation of rights, the no-gain and no-loss principles require us to nullify the 
gains and losses in rights and liberties that result from the consent. 
How do we nullify the gains and losses in rights and liberties that result from 
vitiated consent? Quite simply, we treat vitiated consent as ineffective. If I consent to 
give a gunman my bicycle when he threatens to kill me, then my consent would be 
ineffective. Although I might physically hand over the bike, I would nevertheless retain 
both liberties to use the bike and rights against others’ use of it, and the gunman would 
gain no such rights and liberties. Although the gunman would have physical control over 
the bicycle, morally he would have the same duty not to use the bike and not to interfere 
with my use of the bike that he had before he seized the bike. The gains and losses that 
would have resulted from the vitiated consent had it been treated as ineffective are 
thereby nullified.
15
 (Which is not to deny that additional action will be needed to nullify 
the gains and losses resulting from the seizure of the bike, but that is a separate matter.) 
 23 
One might object that there is an alternative way to nullify the gains and losses 
associated with vitiated consent, and that I have arbitrarily chosen the above method over 
this alternative. The alternative way would be to treat the consent as effective in changing 
rights and liberties, and then require a perpetrator to compensate his victim by consenting 
to return those rights and liberties, or by giving something of equal value to his victim 
instead. On this model, for example, if I consent to give a gunman my bicycle because he 
threatens to kill me if I don’t, then the gunman would gain rights and liberties to use and 
to prevent others from using the bike, and I would lose these rights and liberties. The 
gunman would, however, have a duty to compensate me by consenting to return the rights 
and liberties to me, or by giving me something of equal value instead. Now it is true that 
this alternative would also succeed in nullifying the gains and losses brought about by 
vitiated consent, albeit in a much more roundabout manner than the previous way. But 
the point is that we are not here trying to justify new ways of dealing with the 
consequences of rights violations and threatened rights violations. Rather, our purpose is 
to explain and to tidy up our existing intuitions about limits to consent’s capacity to 
legitimise, and in particular the intuition that consent brought about by a violation or 
threatened violation should in fact be treated as ineffective. My claim is that this intuition 
is best explained in terms of its nullifying the gains and losses brought about by the 
vitiated consent. That is, the intuition that consent brought about by a violation or 
threatened violation of rights is ineffective can, like norms of compensation and 
rectification, be explained as an expression of the no-gain and no-loss principles. 
Note that either the no-gain or the no-loss principle would, on its own, provide 
sufficient ground to treat consent as ineffective. As such, consent should be treated as 
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ineffective if either the consenting agent is the victim of a violation, or if the recipient is 
the perpetrator of the violation. It will often be the case both that the consenting agent is 
the victim of a violation, and that the recipient is the perpetrator of the violation; but 
where there is a third party involved and only one of these conditions is satisfied, we 
should still treat consent as ineffective. For example, in cases of what Steiner calls liberal 
exploitation, the recipient violates a third party’s rights in order to secure an exchange 
with the consenting agent on favourable terms, without facing competition from the third 
party. Alan, for example, might say to Betty, ‘I am going to offer Charlie £3 for his 
hammock. Don’t you dare offer Charlie more than £2 for his hammock: if you do, I’ll 
punch you!’. The no-gain principle can explain why consent in such cases should be 
treated as ineffective in terms of the need to prevent the recipient from gaining by his 
violation.
16
 
  
VII. BRINGING ABOUT 
If the argument so far is right, that some intuitive limits to consent’s capacity to 
legitimise can be explained as expressions of the no-gain and no-loss principles, then we 
can use this finding to begin to tidy up our intuitions, by determining exactly when 
consent should be rendered ineffective according to the no-gain and no-loss principles. In 
order to do so, an important question to be addressed is, when should we say that an act 
of consent is brought about by a violation or threatened violation of rights? What relation 
is required to exist between the violation or threat and the subsequent consent in order to 
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trigger the no-gain and no-loss principles? The danger is that without clarifying when an 
act of consent is brought about by a violation, the use of the no-gain and no-loss 
principles to determine limits to consent’s capacity to legitimise could yield absurd 
results. For example, suppose that, having been physically attacked in the street, a man 
returns home to his partner, shaken and upset. The man’s partner embraces him and the 
embrace quickly leads to sex. Had the man not just been attacked, and had his partner not 
wanted to comfort him, neither the man nor his partner would have wanted to have sex 
that particular evening. Without clarifying when an act of consent is brought about by a 
violation, it might seem that the man’s being attacked in the street brought about both the 
man’s consent to sex and his partner’s consent to sex; this would, according to the no-
gain and no-loss principles, give the absurd result that neither the man nor his partner had 
effectively consented to sex. 
The problem of determining what normatively relevant relation must hold 
between an action and some consequence is not unique to the no-gain and no-loss 
principles. Any moral principles which attach relevance to how particular consequences 
were brought about must face similar difficulties. Consequentialists, of course, face this 
problem. As do luck egalitarians, who are concerned to establish whether or not a 
particular outcome was brought about by an agent’s choice or not. In fact, anyone who 
endorses even a minimal set of crimes, even libertarians, will sometimes confront 
difficult questions about whether or not a particular agent’s action should count as a 
crime on the basis that the action brought about a particular harm (or whether the action 
should count as one crime rather than another – manslaughter rather than reckless 
driving, for example). Despite the difficulties with which the relation is attended, a few 
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comments might at least serve to provide some guidance in determining when consent is 
brought about by a violation or threatened violation and when, therefore, consent should 
be treated as ineffective in accordance with the no-gain and no-loss principles. 
First, the relevant relation that must exist between the violation or threat and the 
consent does not require that the perpetrator intend to bring about the consent. Nor does 
the relevant relation require that the perpetrator foresee the consent, or even that the 
consent was a foreseeable result of the violation or threat. According to any plausible 
interpretation of the no-gain and no-loss principles, gains and losses can sometimes be 
considered illegitimate even if they occur entirely unexpectedly or accidentally, because 
of the violation or threat. Suppose, for example, that Jack is in a bad mood after falling 
half way down a hill. Jack’s bad mood makes him aggressive, and when Jill comes to 
Jack’s aid he promptly pushes her down the remainder of the hill. Unbeknown to both 
Jack and Jill, there is a concealed mineshaft at the bottom of hill which Jill, tumbling 
down the hill, falls into, suffering massive spinal injuries as a result. That Jack did not 
foresee that his pushing Jill down the hill would result in such a terrible outcome (indeed, 
he would never have pushed her had he realised) does not relieve Jack of the burden of 
compensating Jill for the losses she suffers as a result of her injuries. 
One necessary condition for the applicability of the no-gain and no-loss principles 
is that the gain or loss was caused by the violation or threatened violation. But this still 
leaves us a long way from knowing when a gain or loss was brought about by a violation 
or threatened violation, in the sense required by the no-gain and no-loss principles. One 
reason for this is that there is widespread disagreement over what causation itself implies. 
Furthermore, since we are concerned with how the no-gain and no-loss principles apply 
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to acts of consent brought about by a violation or threatened violation, we face special 
difficulties in analysing action causation. It seems likely that action causation cannot be 
analysed in the same manner as straightforward event causation, requiring instead a 
special analysis of how one agent provides or changes another agent’s reasons for 
action.
17
 
More problematically still, even if the causation requirement is a necessary 
condition for an action’s having some consequence in the normatively relevant sense, it 
certainly isn’t a sufficient condition. On a non-normatively loaded understanding of 
causation, it might be true that one cause of the driver’s running over the child was the 
brewing of the beer which the driver drank minutes before he ran over the child. Likewise 
another cause of the driver’s running over the child might be that a woman whom the 
driver found particularly attractive happened to step out of a shop and catch his eye at just 
the moment the child stepped into the road. But neither the brewing of the beer nor the 
woman’s stepping out of the shop brought about the road accident. The road accident 
was brought about by the driver’s drink-driving. 
In seeking to discover what brought about some consequence, we must work 
backwards down the various causal chains which jointly eventuated in the consequence 
of concern, until we reach some cause which has, in Hart and Honoré’s terms, ‘a special 
finality at the level of common sense’.18 What determines which cause has this special 
finality varies with the context and the nature of the causal chain under consideration, and 
one’s reason for seeking an explanation of some consequence. When one’s interest in 
seeking an explanation of some consequence is for the purpose of moral prescription, as 
when we seek to apply the no-gain and no-loss principles, normative considerations will 
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certainly play a role in this determination. One suggestion made by Hart and Honoré 
which seems to me both substantially correct and which yields plausible results when we 
come to apply the no-gain and no-loss principles in what follows (though the arguments 
that follow do not depend on the truth of the suggestion), is that very often voluntary 
human action has this special finality. As Hart and Honoré put it, ‘A deliberate human act 
is therefore most often a barrier and a goal in tracing back causes in such inquiries: it is 
often something through which we do not trace the cause of a later event and something 
to which we do trace the cause through intervening causes of other kinds.’19 
The suggestion that voluntary actions have a special place in explaining what 
brought about some consequence can serve to guide us in identifying cases of vitiated 
consent, cases in which consent is brought about by a violation or threatened violation of 
rights. The suggestion implies that a violation or threatened violation brings about an act 
of consent when it renders the consent involuntary.
20
 If a violation or threatened violation 
does not render an agent’s consent involuntary, then the violation or threatened violation 
will not have brought about the consent in the relevant normative sense. For if the 
consent is voluntary, no further explanation would be required: the consenting agent’s 
will would itself be a cause with the requisite finality to have brought about the consent 
and consequent gains and losses of rights or liberties. 
Although we can be guided by the thought that a violation or threatened violation 
brings about consent only if it renders the consent involuntary, we cannot simply use this 
thought (together with the no-gain and no-loss principles) to fix limits to consent’s 
capacity to legitimise, without further reference to our intuitions on the matter. We need 
our intuitive judgements to guide our understanding of voluntariness – and to confirm its 
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relevance to limits to consent’s capacity to legitimise – as much as we need the 
voluntariness principle to help us secure our intuitions on the matter. This is not to say 
that we should create a logical circle whereby we explain our intuitive judgements in 
terms of a notion of voluntariness which is itself justified by reference to those intuitive 
judgements. Rather, it is to say that both our intuitive judgements and our understanding 
of voluntariness have some independent purchase, but that the independent purchase of 
both is insufficiently clear in places, so that we require reference to the other in order to 
emerge with a satisfactory account of limits to consent’s capacity to legitimise. By 
pursuing this approach we will emerge with an account that does justice both to our 
contested intuitions and to the deeper theoretical framework of the no-gain and no-loss 
principles. 
Let us look, then, in the following section, at the various ways in which violations 
and threatened violations can bring about consent. In doing so, we will see how the no-
gain and no-loss principles can explain many of our central intuitions about procedural 
limits to consent’s capacity to legitimise. 
 
VIII. WHAT THE NO-GAIN AND NO-LOSS PRINCIPLES TELL US ABOUT 
PROCEDURAL LIMITS 
 
The principal ways in which a violation or threatened violation intuitively can bring 
about an act of consent correspond closely to the three headings under which I said 
intuitive procedural limits to consent’s capacity to legitimise could be grouped. It seems 
plausible to regard these as the three ways in which the agent’s consent can be rendered 
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involuntary, so that the violation or threatened violation, rather than the consenting 
agent’s own will, is the cause with the relevant special finality. The three ways are as 
follows. First, one might bring about another’s consent by altering her set of options in a 
manner that leads her to consent. Second, one might bring about another’s consent by 
altering or failing to alter those of an agent’s beliefs upon which her decision to consent 
was partly based. And third, one might bring about another’s consent by altering her 
mental state, such that the agent consents without making a reasoned decision to do so, 
on the basis of the options and information available to her. That the no-gain/no-loss 
approach to the explanation of such intuitive limits is able to explain where these three 
headings come from is a point in its favour, a reason to accept the explanation. Let us 
look at each in more depth to determine more precisely what limits to consent’s capacity 
to legitimise are implied by the no-gain and no-loss principles in each case. 
 
i. Alternatives Revisited 
One of the most widely agreed-upon limits to consent’s capacity to legitimise, the 
intuition that consent is sometimes rendered ineffective if given in order to avoid a threat 
to violate one’s rights being carried out, can easily be explained by the no-loss and no-
gain principles. When an agent is coerced in this manner, his consent is rendered 
ineffective because it is brought about by a threat to violate his rights. The threat brings 
about the agent’s consent by limiting the set of options from which he has to choose. But 
this limit is not the only intuitive limit to consent’s capacity to legitimise which the no-
gain and no-loss principles can justify in the case of alternatives. A violation of an 
agent’s rights, rather than a threatened violation, can also alter an agent’s option set in a 
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manner which brings about the agent’s consent. When a violation of an agent’s rights 
alters her option set so as to bring about her consent, the no-gain and no-loss principles 
require, in accordance with intuition, that her consent be treated as ineffective. This 
explains why your consent is ineffective in the example we looked at above, where I push 
you into a deep hole (a violation of your rights), then demand that you consent to pay me 
one million pounds to lower down a rope by which you may escape from the hole. 
Although you might physically hand over one million pounds in the hope that I might be 
satisfied with a physical transfer of the money, you cannot make it the case that I gain 
normative ownership of the one million pounds. 
How must a violation or threatened violation alter an agent’s set of options in 
order that the consent can be considered to have been brought about by the violation or 
threatened violation, rather than by the consenting agent’s own will, in the manner 
required to trigger the no-gain and no-loss principles? It is insufficient merely to require 
that the violation or threatened violation provided a reason for the consent and thereby 
caused the consent – as we saw, even if causation is necessary, it is unlikely to be 
sufficient for normatively relevant bringing about. If one endorses the thought discussed 
above, that a violation or threatened violation brings about consent only if it renders 
consent involuntary, then the question becomes, how must the agent’s option set be 
altered in order to render the agent’s consent involuntary and thereby to rob the 
consenting agent’s will of explanatory finality? 
Various suggestions have been made as to how a violation or threatened violation 
must alter an agent’s set of options in order that the consent can be considered to have 
been brought about by the violation or threatened violation. One such suggestion is that 
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the violation or threatened violation must leave the agent with no alternative that is not 
considerably worse than the option to consent.
21
 But this suggestion seems somewhat 
implausible: why should it matter whether a violation or threatened violation leaves the 
agent with options that are considerably worse than consenting rather than options that 
are merely worse than consenting? A second suggestion is that, in order for consent to be 
rendered ineffective by virtue of its having been given in response to a coercive threat, 
the consenting agent must also be entitled to succumb to the threat.
22
 Again, this 
suggestion seems unsatisfactory, since it simply reframes the problem of determining 
when a threat brings about a violation in terms of determining when a consenting agent is 
entitled to succumb to the threat, leaving the substantive question about when such 
circumstances obtain wholly unanswered. 
The most plausible answer to the question, how must a violation or threatened 
violation alter an agent’s set of options in order for consent to be brought about by the 
violation or threatened violation, is that the consenting agent must be left with no 
reasonable alternative other than to consent. This proposal affirms the suggestion that 
consent is brought about by a violation or threatened violation when rendered 
involuntary, since the presence of a reasonable alternative might well be thought to be a 
prerequisite for voluntary action. There is much to be said, which I do not intend to say 
here, about what constitutes a reasonable alternative. But the proposal does seem to have 
a certain prima facie appeal. It can explain, for example, why Punch’s consent to give 
Judy £40 when threatened with the alternative of having £50 forcibly stolen is ineffective, 
but why Punch’s consent to give Judy £100 when threatened with the forcible theft of 
£50 is not so obviously ineffective. It would be reasonable for Punch to hand over £40 in 
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order to avoid the theft of £50, but it would not be reasonable of Punch to hand over £100 
in order to avoid the theft of £50 (assuming no other harm is caused by the theft). 
  
ii. Information Revisited 
Violations and threatened violations of rights can bring about consent by affecting 
the beliefs of the consenting agent in a manner which leads her to consent, or by 
preventing the agent from obtaining information which would stop her consenting. For 
example, suppose that Harry’s burning Sally’s newspaper prevented Sally from 
discovering that the housing market had just crashed. Sally’s subsequent consent to buy 
Harry’s house at a price that she would not have agreed to if she had known about the 
crash is ineffective, since Sally’s ignorance of the crash was brought about by Harry’s 
violation of Sally’s property right in the newspaper. Again, this seems to fit with the 
thought that a violation or threatened violation brings about consent only if it renders the 
consent involuntary, since one might plausibly regard consent in such cases as 
involuntary, or at least as not entirely voluntary.
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We have seen that an agent’s consent can be rendered ineffective by a violation or 
threatened violation that alters an agent’s beliefs or prevents her obtaining relevant 
information. But can an agent’s consent also be rendered ineffective, as is often thought, 
just by another agent’s conveying false information, or failing to convey true information 
to the agent? In determining whether any such limits can be justified by the no-gain and 
no-loss principles, the main problem is to determine which such conveyances or failures 
to convey count as violations of rights. The limits to consent’s capacity to legitimise 
relating to the provision of false information or the withholding of true information 
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depend on what rights to information one thinks that a consenting agent possesses. I shall 
consider three of the most common positions taken on this matter. I shall not seek to 
arbitrate between these three positions here, but this need not prevent us from exploring 
the implications of each position for limits to consent’s capacity to legitimise.  
The first position holds that agents in an agreement have neither rights that they 
be given true information nor rights that they not be given false information. According 
to this position, one cannot render consent ineffective either by withholding true 
information from a consenting agent or by providing false information to a consenting 
agent, since one’s provision or withholding does not constitute a violation of his rights. 
Those who adopt this first position often claim that an agent’s consent can only be 
rendered ineffective by another’s provision of false information if the provider of the 
false information explicitly warrants his claims. 
The second position holds that agents do sometimes have rights against 
misinformation, although they never have rights to any information. According to the 
second position, consent is not rendered ineffective by a failure to supply information, 
but consent can be rendered ineffective when an agent is provided with false or 
misleading information. Those who adopt this position need to specify how widely they 
intend the putative rights against misinformation to be interpreted: whether these rights 
can be violated and consent rendered ineffective when an agent is misled, or only when 
she is provided with false information. As Grice famously argued, a proposition does not 
need to be false in order to be misleading.
24
 A car salesman might, for example, tell a 
potential buyer that there may be a fault with the car he is seeking to sell, but dress up his 
disclosure as if it were just a disclaimer. What the salesman says is, strictly speaking, 
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true. But it is misleading nevertheless. There is in fact a major fault with the car, and the 
salesman knows it. Those who adopt the second position also need to specify whether 
they hold that consent can only be rendered ineffective when an agent is intentionally 
provided with false or misleading information, or whether they think that consent can 
also be rendered ineffective when an agent is unintentionally but negligently (or even 
unintentionally and non-negligently) provided with false or misleading information. 
The third position holds that agents have a right that certain relevant background 
information which might have a bearing on their decision to consent be given to them, if 
such information is possessed or could reasonably be obtained by those against whom the 
right is held.
25
 (Those who adopt this position usually think that agents also enjoy rights 
against misinformation.) Relevant background information might include, for example, 
information about a product that one proposes to buy, information about what the 
recipient of one’s consent will do in return for the consent, information about the identity 
of the recipient, information about alternative options open to the consenting agent. 
According to this position, simply by withholding the relevant information, a recipient 
can render an agent’s consent ineffective, since the consent will have been brought about 
by a violation of the consenting agent’s right to information. But even if one thinks that 
the agent has a right to some relevant information, it is not always obvious what 
information she has a right to. For example, what duties of disclosure does a man have to 
a woman with whom he is seeking sexual relations? Does he have a duty to disclose that 
he has a sexually transmitted disease? Does he have a duty to disclose that he is married, 
or that he has been sleeping with his potential partner’s sister? Does he have a duty to tell 
his potential partner that he isn’t very good in bed? Those who adopt the third position 
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need not hold that a consenting agent has a right to every possible piece of information 
which the recipient can reasonably provide, which might have a bearing on her decision 
to consent. 
 
iii. Competence Revisited 
 The final way in which a violation or threatened violation can bring about an 
agent’s consent is by rendering the agent mentally incompetent. For example, if Harry 
injects Sally with a drug, or threatens to punch her if she doesn’t drink some intoxicating 
liquid which he offers her, then Sally’s subsequent intoxicated consent to sleep with 
Harry is rendered ineffective by the role of the violation or threatened violation in 
bringing about her consent. Whereas violations and threatened violations which bring 
about an act of consent by way of alternatives or information alter what it is rational for 
the agent to do in the light of her options and beliefs, violations and threatened violations 
which bring about an act of consent by way of incompetence prevent the agent from 
deciding rationally to consent at all. Again, it seems plausible to regard this as a further 
way in which the consent can be rendered involuntary, in line with the suggestion that a 
violation or threatened violation brings about an act of consent when it renders the 
consent involuntary. 
Note that although, as we have seen, paternalist considerations are well suited to 
explaining some of our intuitions about the conditions under which consent is rendered 
ineffective by incompetence, this does not preclude the possibility that the no-gain and 
no-loss principles might also explain further intuitions about when consent is rendered 
ineffective by incompetence. In particular, whereas paternalist considerations are well 
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suited to explaining uncertain intuitions which suggest that consent is sometimes 
rendered ineffective by incompetence regardless of the cause of the incompetence, the 
no-gain and no-loss principles are better suited to explaining the relatively certain 
intuition that incompetence brought about by a violation or threatened violation renders 
consent ineffective. For example, paternalist considerations can explain the uncertain 
intuition which suggests that perhaps the consent to sex of a particularly intoxicated agent 
should be treated as ineffective. But it takes the no-gain and no-loss principles to explain 
the intuition that the consent to sex of a forcibly intoxicated agent should certainly be 
treated as ineffective. 
Note also that the issue of what rights to information we have is relevant to the 
question, when is consent rendered ineffective by incompetence? Suppose, for example, 
that Sally is intoxicated by deception – perhaps Harry buys her a drink from the bar but 
slips in a drug before giving the drink to her. Whether or not Sally’s subsequent consent 
is rendered ineffective by appeal to the no-gain and no-loss principle depends on whether 
or not the deception that led to Sally’s intoxication was a violation of her rights. And 
whether the deception that led to Sally’s intoxication was a violation of her rights 
depends on whether Sally had a right to be told that her drink had been spiked, or whether 
it was her own responsibility to determine the drink’s content, perhaps by buying a drug 
testing kit and testing the drink before drinking it. 
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IX. CONCLUSION 
Many of our most firmly held intuitions about procedural limits to consent’s capacity to 
legitimise can be explained in terms of the no-gain and no-loss principles. The no-gain 
and no-loss principles, I have argued, explain why consent should be treated as 
ineffective when it is brought about by a violation or threatened violation of rights. By 
clarifying the various ways in which consent can be brought about by a violation or 
threatened violation of rights, we have been able to tidy up our intuitions about limits to 
consent’s capacity to legitimise. The achievements of the no-gain and no-loss explanation 
of limits to consent’s capacity to legitimise may be summarised as follows. 
First, the explanation provides a clear endorsement of the widely held intuition 
that coerced consent is ineffective, and that the consent of an agent whose option set is 
restricted because of a past violation is also sometimes ineffective. It allows us to resolve 
the question, what types of threat render consent ineffective? According to the no-gain 
and no-loss explanation, threats can only render consent ineffective if they are threats to 
violate rights. Furthermore, the explanation allows us to understand why violations and 
threatened violations do not always render consent ineffective, only doing so if they 
restrict the agent’s option set in an appropriate way, perhaps by eliminating all reasonable 
alternatives and thereby rendering the consent involuntary. 
Second, the no-gain/no-loss approach explains the intuition that consent can be 
rendered ineffective by violations which alter agent’s beliefs or prevent them from 
obtaining information that would stop them consenting. It can account for disagreement 
about whether the mere provision of false information or the withholding of true 
information can render consent ineffective. Such disagreement, the no-gain/no-loss 
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approach suggests, is ultimately grounded in diverging views about what rights to 
information agents have. 
Finally, the explanation fills the gap left by paternalist explanations in the case of 
incompetence. Paternalist explanations can explain the relatively uncertain intuition that 
the consent of incompetent agents in general is sometimes ineffective. But the no-gain 
and no-loss approach can explain the stronger intuition that consent is definitely 
ineffective when given by an agent who was rendered incompetent by a violation or 
threatened violation of his rights. 
The implications of these findings are widespread. The conclusions about 
information and competence may be of particular interest to medical ethics, whilst the 
conclusions about coercive threats may be of interest to those concerned with rape law. 
Perhaps the findings will be of most general interest, however, to those concerned with 
the justice of market exchanges. For we are now equipped not only to insist that market 
exchanges brought about by a violation or threatened violation of rights should be treated 
as ineffective, but also to be much more precise about when market exchanges should be 
treated as ineffective for this reason. Even libertarians, with their otherwise scant moral 
framework, treat not only theft but also market exchanges bought about by a violation or 
threatened violation of rights as failing to preserve justice in transfer. The no-gain and 
no-loss principles, I have shown, can both justify this central part of the libertarian theory 
of justice and help us to understand its implications for the market.
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1
 The best argument for this view, as I have argued elsewhere, is that a plausible characterisation of 
consent and various aspects of the manner in which consent intuitively functions is only possible if the 
presence of an act is also necessary for consent. 
2
 I use the term liberty in the sense of a Hohfelian privilege: one has a liberty to do something when one 
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